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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we present a simple yet effective way to im-
prove a face verification system by generating multiple vir-
tual samples from the unique image corresponding to an
access request. These images are generated using simple
geometric transformations. This method is often used dur-
ing training to improve accuracy of a neural network model
by making it robust against minor translation, scale and ori-
entation change. The main contribution of this paper is to
introduce such method during testing. By generating  
images from one single image and propagating them to a
trained network model, one obtains   scores. By merging
these scores using a simple mean operator, we show that the
variance of merged scores is decreased by a factor between
1 and   . An experiment is carried out on the XM2VTS
database which achieves new state-of-the-art performances.
1. INTRODUCTION
Biometric authentication (BA) is the problem of verifying
an identity claim using a person’s behavioural and physi-
ological characteristics. BA is becoming an important al-
ternative to traditional authentication methods such as keys
(“something one has”, i.e., by possession) or PIN numbers
(“something one knows”, i.e., by knowledge) because it is
essentially “who one is”, i.e., by biometric information. There-
fore, it is not susceptible to misplacement, forgetfulness or
reproduction. Examples of biometric sources are finger-
print, face, voice, hand-geometry and retina scans. General
introduction of biometrics can be found in [5]. Biometric
data is often noisy because of the failure of biometric de-
vices to capture the plastic nature of biometric traits (e.g.
deformed fingerprint due to different pressures), corruption
by environmental noise, variability over time and occlusion
by the user’s accessories. The higher the noise, the less re-
liable the biometric system becomes. Current biometric-
based security systems (devices, algorithms, architectures)
still have room for improvement, particularly in their accu-
racy, tolerance to various noisy environments and scalabil-
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ity as the number of individuals increases. The focus of this
study is to improve the system accuracy by directly min-
imising the noise by using multiple virtual samples, when
multiple real samples are not available.
In the literature, to the best of our knowledge, the closest
work to ours is the one reported by Kittler et al [1]. The fun-
damental difference is that they assume that multiple sam-
ples are available. In real-life situation, where a face im-
age is scanned and transfered over a communication line,
obtaining multiple face images for each access may not be
feasible. In this case, “virtual” samples could be used. Al-
though there is no gain in information, in this paper, it is
shown that accuracy can still be exploited by reducing vari-
ance of the virtual samples. Moreover, this approach can be
easily generalised to other pattern recognition problems.
An alternative approach to creating variations due to ge-
ometric transformation is to synthesize virtual images from
an approximated user-customized 3D model. This approach,
although maybe more effective than the proposed method,
is not considered here due to the possible inaccuracy of ap-
proximating the model in the first place. Our approach does
not require such an estimation.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2
explains the theoretical bounds in the expected gain coming
from averaging scores; a description of the experiment can
be found in Section 3; this is followed by conclusions.
2. VARIANCE REDUCTION VIA AVERAGING
2.1. Variance reduction
Let us assume that the measured relationship between a fea-
ture vector  
 
and its associated score 
 
can be written as:
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where   is the true relation and 
 
is a random additive
noise with zero mean. The mean of  over  trials, denoted
as  is:
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With enough samples, the expected value of , denoted as
, which is estimated by the mean of , approximates the
“true” measure:
      (3)
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Moreover, the variance of  can be written as:
Var  

 
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Therefore, it can be concluded that when   scores of a sin-
gle biometric source are averaged, noise that occurs due to
classification can be reduced by a factor of   . The effect of
averaging in Equation 2 can best be observed using syntheti-
cally generated data in Figure 1. Assume that in the original
problem, the genuine user scores follow a normal distribu-
tion of mean 1.0 and variance 0.9, denoted as   	,
and that the impostor scores follow a normal distribution of
  
 (both graphs are plotted with ’+’). If for each
access, three confidence scores are available, according to
Equation 5, the variance of the resulting distribution will be
reduced by a factor of three. Both resulting distributions
are plotted with ’o’. Note the area where both the distribu-
tions cross before and after. This area corresponds to the
zone where minimum amount of mistakes will be commit-
ted given that the threshold is optimal 1. The decrease in
this area means an improvement in the recognition rate. In
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Fig. 1. Averaging scores distribution in a two-class problem
general, the more samples are used, the sharper (taller and
with shorter tails at both ends) both the impostors’ and the
clients’ score distributions become. The sharper they are,
the lower the area where these two distributions overlap.
The lower this area is, the lower the number of mistakes
committed.
2.2. Error reduction
The above discussion is only true when scores are corrupted
by noise with zero-mean and uncorrelated. In reality, one
knows that scores coming from virtual samples are depen-
dent on the original image. What would then be the upper
1Optimal in the Bayes sense, when (1) the cost and (2) probability of
both types of errors are equal.
and lower bounds of such a gain? Here, we refer to the
work of Bishop [2, Chap. 9] who has shown that by av-
eraging scores of   classifiers, a committee could perform
better than a single classifier. The assumptions were that
each classifier was not correlated and that the error of each
classifier had zero mean. He showed that:
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where err

is the error of the committee and err
 
is the error
associated to the -th classifier. Note that the major differ-
ence between Bishop’s context and ours is that scores are
due to variation of   classifiers. In our context, scores are
due to variation in the “virtual” samples obtained from  
geometric transformations. The index  is referred to a sam-
ple hereinafter.
Due to the false assumption of uncorrelation in scores
obtained from virtual samples, the error reduction obtained
using the mean operator will not be   as shown in Equa-
tion 7 but less. This equation should be rightly written as:
err
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where  can be understood as a “gain” in error reduction. It
shows that the maximum gain in averaging scores is   with
respect to the average performance of each virtual sample.
This is, in practice, not attainable since the scores are cor-
related. The minimum gain, according to Equation 8 is 1,
which means that there is no gain but one does not loose
in the combination neither. This can be understood as fol-
lows: If the errors made by each virtual score are dependent,
i.e., they make exactly the same error in the extreme case
(
 
err
 
  err

), then meanerr   err
 
  err

, which
implies that    .
3. EXPERIMENT
3.1. Database and Protocols
The XM2VTS face database is used for this purpose be-
cause it is a benchmark database with well-defined proto-
cols called the Lausanne Protocols [3]. The XM2VTS database
contains synchronized image and speech data recorded on
295 subjects during four sessions taken at one month in-
tervals. On each session, two recordings were made, each
consisting of a speech shot and a head rotation shot.
The database was divided into three sets: a training set,
an evaluation set, and a test set. The training set was used
to build client models, while the evaluation set was used to
compute the decision (by estimating thresholds for instance,
or parameters of a fusion algorithm). Finally, the test set
was used only to estimate the performance of the system.
The 295 subjects were divided into a set of 200 clients,
25 evaluation impostors, and 70 test impostors. Two dif-
ferent evaluation configurations were defined. They differ
in the distribution of client training and client evaluation
data. Both the training client and evaluation client data were
drawn from the same recording sessions for configuration I
(LP1) which might lead to biased estimation on the evalua-
tion set and hence poor performance on the test set. For con-
figuration II (LP2) on the other hand, the evaluation client
and test client sets were drawn from different recording ses-
sions which might lead to more realistic results. More de-
tails can be obtained from [3].
In this database, each access is represented by only one
face image. We can increase the number of images by using
geometric transformations. In this way, we obtain multiple
“virtual” samples from a single access. For each virtual im-
age, features will be extracted in the same way as a real face
image. Both feature extraction and geometric transforma-
tions are explained in sections below.
3.2. Features
In the XM2VTS database, a bounding box is placed on a
face according to eyes coordinates located manually. This
assumes a perfect face detection. The face is cropped and
the extracted sub-image is downsized to a    image.
After enhancement and smoothing, the face image has a fea-
ture vector of dimension .
In addition to these normalised features, RGB (Red-
Green-Blue) histogram features are used. To construct this
additional feature set, a skin colour look-up table must first
be constructed using a large number of colour images which
contain only skin. In the second step, face images are fil-
tered according to this look-up table. Unavoidably, non-
skin pixels are captured as well. This noise will be sub-
mitted to a classifier to discriminate its degree of relevance.
For each color channel, a histogram is built using  dis-
crete bins. Hence, the histograms of three channels, when
concatenated, form a feature vector of 	
 elements. More
details about this method, including experiments, can be ob-
tained from [4].
3.3. Geometric Transformations
The extended number of patterns is computed such that given
an access image,  geometric transformations are performed.
This number is calculated as follows:     	
, which
shows the mirrored number of shifted and scaled face pat-
terns. 	   number of shifts     is the total number of
shifts, in  directions, including the original frame, for each
scale. 
   number of scales     is the total number
of scales, in  directions (zooming-in and zooming-out), in-
cluding the original scale. In the experiment, 4 shifts and 2
scales are used. This produces 330 virtual images per origi-
nal image.
In the following experiments, we compared the system
from [4] (denoted “original”) to our system (denoted “av-
eraged”). In the original system, geometric transformations
were added to the training set only, while in the averaged
system, they were also added to the evaluation and test sets.
The training set is used to train an MLP for each client
and the evaluation set is used to stop the training using an
early-stopping criterion. At the end of training, the trained
MLP model is applied on the evaluation set again to es-
timate the global threshold that optimises the Equal Error
Rate (EER). Once all parameters are set, including thresh-
old, the trained MLP model is applied on the test set. Thus
the obtained Half Total Error Rate (HTER) on the test set
is said to be a priori, while if the threshold was optimis-
ing EER on the test set, it would be called a posteriori. Of
course, the a priori results are more realistic. In the exper-
iment, the optimised client dependent MLPs had  hidden
units each.
3.4. Results
The experiments are carried out on LP1 and LP2 config-
urations of XM2VTS database. The results are shown in
Tables 1 and 2. Odd lines in these tables show the HTERs
of the original approach while even lines show the HTERs
after averaging virtual scores. In all comparisons, the im-
provements are obvious. The HTERs in Table 1 are a pos-
teriori and thus not realistic, but nevertheless give insights
of the expected improvements. The HTERs in Table 2 are a
priori. As expected, the performance obtained by averaging
is always superior. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge,
the newly obtained a priori results appear to be the best pub-
lished ones on this benchmark database.
Table 1. Performace of averaging scores versus original
approach based on a posteriori selected thresholds
Data sets Models FA[%] FR[%] HTER[%]
LP1 Eval Original 1.667 1.667 1.667
LP1 Eval Averaged 1.333 1.333 1.333
LP2 Eval Original 1.250 1.250 1.250
LP2 Eval Averaged 1.107 1.000 1.054
LP1 Test Original 1.817 1.750 1.783
LP1 Test Averaged 1.692 1.750 1.721
LP2 Test Original 1.726 1.750 1.738
LP2 Test Averaged 1.514 1.500 1.507
Table 2. Performace of averaging scores versus original
approach based on a priori selected thresholds
Data sets Models FA[%] FR[%] HTER[%]
LP1 Test Original 1.230 2.750 1.990
LP1 Test Averaged 1.474 1.750 1.612
LP2 Test Original 1.469 2.250 1.860
LP2 Test Averaged 1.285 1.750 1.518
3.5. Analysis of the results
One insight to examine the effectiveness of this method is
by looking at the probability density function (pdf) of the
330 virtual scores with respect to a false rejection and a cor-
rect acceptance. This is shown in Figure 2. When given
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Fig. 2. Examples of “bad” and “good” photos and their cor-
responding distribution of virtual scores for client 006
an upright-frontal image of a client within a certain allowed
degree of transformation, one obtains a sharply picked pdf
(with very low variance) around the mean 1. The MLP as-
sociated with client 006, in this case, was trained to give a
response of  for a genuine access and  for an impos-
tor access. When the original image is “out” of the allowed
transformation range, the pdf of virtual scores has a large
variance and a mean displaced away from 1. Note that the
logarithmic scale for the probability is used in the graph to
amplify the changes in distribution accross the score range
 .
While a single image normally produces only one score,
a set of virtual images has the advantage of producing an-
other information: the score distribution. One way to mea-
sure this distribution is by its variance. For instance, for the
example above, the variance for the correct acceptance case
is 1.5670e-05 while the variance for the false rejection case
is 0.0181. Clearly, variance of virtual scores can give sup-
plementary information that the original approach cannot.
In general, the pdf (not just the variance) could probably
provide useful insights to improve this method further.
4. CONCLUSION
By applying  various geometric transformations to a given
original face image access, it is shown that one could re-
duce the variance of the original score by a factor between
1 and   , by taking into account the assumption that these
  image samples are dependent on the original image. As
a consequence, the classification error, with respect to the
original method is reduced by a factor between 1 and   as
well.
To put in a formal framework, our proposed approach
can be summarised as:
  

 
 
 
  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instead of      for the test set, where,    is
a set of geometric transformation parameters applied by 
(the transformation function) on the feature vector  ,  is
a feature extraction function and  is a trained classifier on
   over    with   sampled from a training set.
Equation 9 explains why this method is robust against minor
geometric transformations: it is integrated over the space
of these transformations and hence achieves invariance over
this space.
This method has the advantage of being simple to imple-
ment. Furthermore, it does not require multiple real exam-
ples. This makes it easily extendable to many general class-
fication and regression problems. The only added complex-
ity during testing is proportional to the number of artificially
generated samples, given that a suitable transformation for
a given data set can be defined.
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